Gunaryadi, M.A.
(Paper prepared before the European Enlargement 2004)

This paper seeks to explore possible answers to this question: To what extent is a coherent European security and defence policy both justifiable and possible? Exploring answers for the justifiable demands identifications of the need and the mandate or authority given to the ESDP in order to meet the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) objectives within the framework of the European Union. Then the analysis on to what extent the coherent ESDP is possible obliges examination on the ideal capacities it is expected to possess and the actual capabilities it really has. The third notion used to measure whether the ESDP can be considered justifiable and possible is to examine its interactions with the Atlantic Alliance. Before proceeding to the discussions, the immediate section is devoted to the ESDP evolution as a historical background.

ESDP: Evolution of European Defence Community
Many experts have rendered that the conflict in Kosovo had waken up the European Union (EU) leaders that the Union’s current military capabilities are inadequate. It opened their eyes that Kosovo is not in the Middle East, Africa, Korean Peninsula, or other regions of conflict that are remote from Europe. Kosovo is in the Balkans, the EU’s backyard. The crisis inevitably highlighted the EU’s powerlessness to address such crises.

Despite the EU members have been providing most of the current ground units in Kosovo, European militaries are stretched to the limit to meet these requirements while deploying only 2% of their total forces. It was the United States, not the European allies, which took the most sorties and crucial bombardments on the Serbian forces. These American air upper hands included all weather delivery of precision guided munitions, electronic warfare support and attack, aerial refuelling, strategic lift, and the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

It is true that the Kosovo crisis has alarmed the EU about its weakness in security and defence. Yet, the crisis in the Balkans does not wholly shape the European longing to cooperate in defence areas. Historically, the founding of the ‘Brussels Pact’ by France, Britain, and Benelux countries in 1948 reflected this plea. One year later, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established. The initiative became more seriously taken along with the initial integration process of Europe. In 1952, the founding treaty of European Defence Community (EDC) was signed. However, it saw the EDC failed just due to the French National Assembly’s refusal to ratify the treaty two years later. The French refusal implied that any defence cooperation seemed to be too fast and too early.

In 1955, the Western European Union (WEU) was established. Unfortunately, this organisation was considered to have no relevance for more than three decades years. As the European integration process increasingly has become widened and deepened, steps toward that end began showing its more integrated shape. It was the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that stipulated a responsibility of the EU in security matters is established within the framework of the CFSP and outlined the ‘Petersberg Declaration’.

To accommodate the European aspiration, in the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Berlin in 1996, NATO came to a decision to build on a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 covered more aspects of binding regulations within the EU, including the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the EU Treaty.

Furthermore, in 1999, the Cologne Council announced the Declaration on ‘Strengthening the ESDP’; the member States affirmed the objective of reinforcing the CFSP by giving the EU the ability to respond to crises. Also in the same year, this was followed the Helsinki Council where the member states agreed on the setting up, by 2003, of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capable of carrying out the full range of the Petersberg tasks. The force is to be comprised of up to 50,000-60,000 soldiers. The Nice Treaty of 2000 made some institutional adjustments. In 2001, the Laeken Council declared that the Union is now ‘capable of conducting some crisis-management operations’. But the Council also emphasised that substantial progress still needs to be made in the areas of: balanced development of military and civilian capabilities, finalisation of the arrangements with NATO, and implementation of the Nice Arrangements with the Union’s partners.

To What Extent the ESDP is Justifiable?
As slightly touched in the introductory section, an assessment on how justifiable the ESDP is entails identifications of the needs of the ESDP and the mandate or authority given to it in order to meet the objectives of the mechanism that makes it comes into being. It aims at providing the EU with appropriate structures and sufficient—civil and military—operational capabilities to take and implement decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union. To be exact, the ESDP has to be perceived as an instrument to achieve the objectives of the CFSP.

The Maastricht Treaty (The Single European Act of 1992) outlined the framework for CFSP and set as a goal ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’. The WEU was asked ‘to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications’. However, member state obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty were respected, and EU policy was to be ‘compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that (North Atlantic Treaty) framework’. At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘Final Act’ included a declaration by the then nine members of the WEU that the ‘Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defence identity’.

The Amsterdam Treaty went beyond Maastricht, referring to the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy…which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide’. Amsterdam provided for ‘the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide’.

Moreover, ‘The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.’ In addition, when the EU used the WEU ‘to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union’, all member states would be ‘entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question.’ That meant inclusion of EU members that are not also members of NATO.

The Amsterdam Treaty laid down the emphasis on the fundamental objectives of the CFSP. It comprises: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union, to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways, to preserve peace and strengthen international security, to promote international coo-operation, to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Nice Treaty further strengthen the potential of CFSP, by enabling enhanced cooperation to be used for the implementation for joint actions and common positions that do not have military or defence implications.

The need to have a ‘common’ and coherent EU foreign policy is closely related to its present appearance as an actor in the international politics and the pursuing of its global interests. Several compelling factors push the EU to come into view as an international ‘actor’. In terms of economic, trade and investment shares to the global world, the European Union has been as a global actor. It contributed 51 per cent of world’s foreign direct investment outflows, its exports of goods and services constituted 38 per cent of the world market, controlled of 36 per cent of the world’s GNP, provided 56 per cent of official development assistance. Moreover, the EU Member States make up the largest block in the Bretton Woods institutions: 23 per cent of the votes in the World Bank and 29 per cent of the votes in the International Monetary Fund, and it has the largest collective number of votes as a regional grouping in the World Trade Organisation. The successful creation of the single currency gives extra weight to the Union’s new and wider international functions and responsibilities.

From the economic perspective, it is true that the EU has been a global heavyweight player. Nevertheless, it remains as a featherweight one in terms of security and defence. This can be seen from how the Union’s was dependent upon the U.S. defence protection against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, and how it became paralysed to solve the crises in the Balkans and Kosovo. Moreover, the pending enlargement of the Union with 10 countries, which posed the Union with new security challenges, risks and problems, and the post 11 September threats all push the speeding up of the process for having the EU’s common security and defence policy. It must be fully prepared to face the new risks and challenges and play its part on the international scene as a reliable and credible political actor. This political role seemed to match with its economic power.

In addition, its scope of mandate and obligations can justify the ESDP in its actions. Since the ESDP is an integral part of the CFSP, it must contribute to the realisation of the whole range of the CFSP objectives to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the policies. In this understanding, the scope of the ESDP is defined by the CFSP’s objective and its underlying principles. The conceptual framework for the ESDP, then consequently, must be derived from the content of the Amsterdam Treaty and its subsequent amendments. When all of these requirements are met, then the ESDP can be considered justifiable to be employed for promoting objectives and working out suitable responses within the framework conferred to it by the CFSP. The immediate measures to be taken can be in the forms of identifying security risk perceptions, shared interests, and common threats, and the instruments and capabilities should be made available to execute the task. In other words, the ESDP actions must be within the Union’s existing legal instruments.

From the transatlantic perspective, the ESDP can be also justifiable to the extent that it does not affect or diminish in any way the collective defence commitments and duties of the EU’s Member States that belong to the NATO to this Atlantic Alliance. It means that the efforts to further develop the ESDP by the Union is to be complimentary and not an antithetical element of NATO. To avoid duplication with the NATO duties and the use of equipments, the practical deployments of the ESDP should be within the Petersberg tasks, namely humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

How Possible is the ESDP?
Examining to what extent the coherent ESDP is possible, requires essentially an assessment on the ideal capacities it is expected to possess in order to accomplish its tasks as mandated and the actual capabilities it really has. This also implies the need to scrutinise the existing ESDP’s weaknesses and potentials.

The ESDP confers on the Union with the capacity to take autonomous, purposeful action, especially where NATO is not prepared or staying aloof to become engaged. For this purpose, the Union needs and is developing concrete operational capabilities based on credible military forces. This led to the decision to set up a mechanism designed to allow the Union to respond rapidly, efficiently, and in flexible manner to situations or times of crisis. This became the basis for creating a rapid-reaction mechanism that eventually led to the formation of the RRF within the context of the ESDP structure.

To work out the ESDP military capabilities, the EU Member States have set the so-called ‘Headline Goal’, where they agreed that by 2003, cooperating voluntarily together, they will be able to deploy self-sustaining forces up to corps level i.e. up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 personnel. As an addition to this pledge, if appropriate, they will be able to deploy naval and air elements within 60 days and to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. Furthermore, they decided to develop ‘Collective Capability Goals’ in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport.

To maintain the delicate balance with NATO, the implementation of the ‘Headline Goal’ and the ‘Collective Capability Goals’ does neither imply the creation of European Armed Forces nor the creation of additional forces. The goals will be simply met by reorganising the existing forces.

At the Capabilities Commitment Conference of 20 November 2000, the Union Member States pledged sufficient forces to meet the ‘Headline Goal’. However, with regard to the quality of these forces e.g. sustainability, deployability, interoperability, etc., potential deficiencies will most likely be identical with those already identified within the framework of NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative.

To make a more formidable and compact deployment of the ESDP elements, the Union provides the opportunity for dialogue with the six non-EU European NATO members including Canada on issues related to security and defence policy and crisis management. In the event of a crisis, these structures will serve for consultation in the period leading up to a Council decision. When needed, upon a Council decision to launch a EU-led military operation, the non-EU European NATO members might be allowed to participate, if they so wish, in a EU-led military operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. They will, on a Council decision, be invited to take part in EU-led military operations where the EU does not use NATO assets. Those non-EU European NATO members that have confirmed their participation in an EU-led military operation by deploying significant military forces will have the same rights and obligations as participating EU Member States in the ‘Committee of Contributors’, which is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the operation.

There is also possibility that the ESDP and NATO act together in the time of crisis. The Union and NATO have agreed to develop consultation and cooperation on questions of common interest relating to security, defence, and crisis management. This mechanism is developed in such a way that full transparency of the process of determining the appropriate military response to crises, and to guarantee effective crisis management can be ensured.
Everything is dependent on the kinds of security and defence needs. In the event of a mounting crisis, EU and NATO will step up their routine consultation and cooperation. If the assessment of the crisis leads to the conclusion that it will be sufficient to address the crisis merely by civil means, the EU will employ appropriate civil means. NATO will not be actively involved, as it does not dispose of civil crisis management capabilities. However, NATO will be kept informed, as there may be the possibility of a deterioration of the crisis, which might necessitate the use of military capabilities. Yet, if the appraisal of the crisis leads to the conclusion that the crisis needs to be addressed by military means, it will be up to NATO to first decide whether it will launch a military operation. If an integrated civil-military operation is deemed necessary, it is likely that NATO takes on responsibility for the military part and the EU for the civil portion.

The EU will embark on a military operation only if NATO declines to do so, i.e. where NATO as a whole is not engaged. For a military operation, the EU can thus choose between three possible alternatives:

1. an EU-operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities;
2. an EU-operation with recourse to NATO planning capabilities only;
3. an ‘autonomous’ EU-operation without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

The first two choices necessitate close coordination and cooperation between EU and NATO. Principles and modalities for EU-recourse to NATO assets and capabilities are discussed between EU and NATO. Furthermore, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe will have a key role as ‘Strategic Coordinator’ for EU-led military operations. He will function as the operational link between EU and NATO in the moments of crisis.

To further examine the ‘possible’ notion of the ESDP, the pervious normative and ideal expectations are mirrored at several empirical achievements particularly as a response to the 11 September. The facts show that there are still some differences in terms of central, proactive, long-term and coordinated planning. Toward the RRF, for example, it is difficult to see how it could emerge as anything other than a second best.

Some significant studies have been conducted recently, all of which broadly concluded that Europe’s shortfalls are more serious than is officially recognised. The first obstacle to the ESDP capabilities and thus possibility is manpower. The RRF is designed to mobilise around 60,000 troops. For rotation purpose, this will require a pool of at least 180,000, although some studies put the figure at 220,000. Even supposing the Member States currently retain about 1.7 million standing army, just over 500,000 are conscripts. This implies that the troops required for RRF undertakings could amount to over 20 per cent of the EU’s available forces. Moreover, not many of them are trained and equipped to the standards that would be required by a high-end Petersberg mission. It is planned to generate by 2006 a pool of 250,000 highly professional, jointly trained, and interoperable troops.

The second drawback is force projection. Even before 11 September, it was expected the RRF might be required for expeditionary missions up to 4,000 kilometres away from home. In addition to the extra demands such force projection will make on training and standardisation, a 4,000 km range would require considerable resources in both sealift and airlift. In both these areas, the current EU capability is lacking.

The third inadequacy is the availability of A400M. The contract for this $16 billion project involving orders for over 200 aircrafts from nine countries should have been signed in Berlin on 15 November. Yet, Germany delayed the signing due to budgetary consideration. Actually, it must be ensured that, by 2010, the EU is autonomously equipped with adequate naval and air assets to project 50,000 troops and associated equipment to a distance of 4,000 km. The Franco-Dutch proposals for a maritime lift force and the Franco-German proposals for a joint air transport command should be combined to generate an EU transport command as outlined by General K. Naumann.

The fourth problem is operational support. The RRF has been identified would be weak in four key ‘force multipliers’ namely in terms of headquarters; communications; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; and air power.

The last obstacle would be the defence spending. Currently, no EU government—even after 11 September—is making a political case for major increases in defence spending. Nevertheless, opinion polls in early 2002 suggested that the public in many countries (including, surprisingly, a large majority in Germany) would be prepared to see an increase in defence spending.

It is hard to see the EU’s RRF will be ‘operational’ in 2003 without meeting such targets outlined above. In December 2003, when expectations of the EU as a military actor are found largely to lack substance, there will be a ‘capabilities and expectations collapse’. An RRF cannot be expected to be prepared to assume high-end Petersberg tasks by, at the very earliest, 2010.

Beyond the limitations above, the ESDP ‘possibility’ also has to face the glaring differences within the EU itself. On the question of Iraq, for example, this skirmish is obvious. In a mini summit in April 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed making its own planning and command staff for operation in which NATO does not involve. The British, as the closest U.S. ally in Europe, expressed disagreement to the proposals. Amidst the preparation to invade Iraq, we saw a drifted atmosphere between London-led pro-war vis-à-vis Paris-led anti-war. London and the conservatives could count on support from neutral countries that are against militarisation of the EU such as Ireland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Malta, and staunch NATO allies like the Netherlands, Poland, and Denmark. Due to the differences between the British and French, the progress of the ESDP can be at stake as Britain is a European military heavyweight, and the France is an engine of the EU defence.

Justifiable and Possible ESDP in the Context of Transatlantic Alliance
This section analyses to what extent of coherent ESDP both justifiable and possible, from transatlantic perspective. It means that the Transatlantic Alliance framework remains very influential to the progress and future of the ESDP.

The slow progress of a European common security and defence policy partly due to the reluctance of the American leaders to sacrifice their dominance of European security affairs, especially when chances for substantive capability improvements are slim. In brief, the U.S. support is indispensable to the success of the ESDP. Without such support furthermore, it may lead to catastrophic situations in the long-standing alliance.

The ESDP is a delicate balancing act for both the EU and the U.S. The transatlantic relations best serve European security interests. Moreover, the U.S. interests are best served through encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defence capability. For its part, the U.S. will have to accept a more balanced position in the area of European security.

Even though it is still unrealistic to expect the United States to continue to dominate European security efforts indefinitely, the Europeans efforts in 1950s to develop a vehicle to give expression to a European concept of common defence independent from but closely coordinated with NATO, was responded by the U.S. with ambivalence. It did welcome the reality that Europeans could do more in their own defence but worry lest that effort might negatively affect transatlantic ties and NATO as well as all-important links to Europe. However, NATO and the U.S. at its Summit endorsed ESDI as part of but apart from NATO laid down by the Maastricht Treaty in April 1999.

Nevertheless, the remains of the U.S. ambivalent attitudes toward the European common security and defence policy still can be seen, for instance, in the different use of terms such as European Security and Defense Identity, European Security and Defence Policy, Common European Security and Defence Policy. NATO, which still proceeds with the preference for creating a European pillar within itself, potentially drawing upon military capabilities ‘separable but not separate’ from the alliance, continues to use the term ESDI, which was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992. In contrast, the EU starting with the Cologne European Council in June 1999, and formally at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council, shifted to using the term ESDP. This emphasises that this was a ‘policy’ of the EU, and not just an ‘identity’ derived from NATO. Adding the ‘C’—for common—does not change the sense of ESDP and thus has no great political significance; but it does upgrade “CESDP” compatible with the overarching Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). There was also an argument that CESDP is an acronym easier to handle in some EU languages than ESDP. At NATO, ‘identity’ sometimes is used to indicate NATO’s part of the relationship and ‘policy’ to denote the EU’s part.

One might ask about the current situation on the credibility of ESDP, which aims at building up military capabilities and strengthening the European pillar in respect to the wide capabilities gap compared to the U.S. Benefiting from the so-called peace-dividend, most of the European defence budgets have been falling in recent years. In terms of military output, Europe’s capabilities correspond to only a fraction of those of the U.S., especially with regard to strategic transport and intelligence, precision guided missiles, command and control. This gap can be attributed to redundancies among European forces, lack of coordination of European defence industries, old-style national forces trained for territorial defence. It is in this context, the U.S. and its supremacy in NATO for many more years will still be playing the roles of traditional defence.

Despite all shortcomings, however, the deployment has been starting to become a reality. The first EDSDP operation was launched on 1 January 2003 under the name of European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina. On 18 March 2003, the Union decided to launch its first military operation in Macedonia, namely the EU-led Military Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Then followed the first ESDP autonomous peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo that accomplished end of August 2003, did not only reflect the ideals of ESDP have become materialised, but also constituted a substantial step forward in the ESDP development.

The French-led mission in Congo also implied that the ESDP is capable of tackling mission beyond the European territory. It was the first military mission outside Europe independent of NATO help. The next missions await the ESDP includes a monitoring task in Moldova, and the takeover of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia next year.

Conclusions
Within the framework provided, it can be concluded that a coherent ESDP is both justifiable and possible to certain extent. It can be considered justifiable as long as it plays the role within the Union existing legal instruments that gives rise to its raison d’être. It is the attainment of the FCSP objectives will frame the justification of the ESDP mandate and missions. A coherent ESDP can be also considered possible to the extent that as long as it can meet the ideal capabilities it supposed to possess in order to accomplish the tasks mandated to it and the actual capabilities it really has.

Notwithstanding the empirical review shows that there are still several hindrances in this ‘possible’ notion, there possibility of the ESDP has been recently starting to be practically ‘operational’ in some parts of Europe, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
However, the justifiable and possible ESDP will only give sense when measured from the transatlantic point of view. The American lingering reluctance to see an autonomous EU defence policy would be another impediment to the progress of the ESDP. In other words, the progress of the ESDP is not only depending upon the EU but also to the extent that the U.S. accepts it.

It is therefore a middle field has to be created to maintain the delicate balance between the American and European aspirations. As R.E. Hunter (2002) pointed out there are no fundamental differences to the long-term nature of transatlantic relationships in the field of defence and military affairs. He suggested subsequently that first the ESDI-ESDP issue should not be dividing the U.S. and European allies in any fundamental way. Secondly, it should be high on the current transatlantic agenda of getting ESDP right. And finally, he saw no apparent reason why serious efforts by U.S. and EU leaders should not produce the desired results—a mutually reinforcing relationship between the European Union, acting through ESDP, and NATO that works for all and for overall security in the transatlantic region. Ultimately and broadly, it can be concluded that besides judging the ESDP in the context of European integration, the extent of coherent ESDP can be best considered both ‘justifiable’ and ‘possible’ from the framework of Atlantic Alliance.

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